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Johnson: Validity of Remainders and Executory Interests after a Fee Condit
VALIDITY OF REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY
INTERESTS AFTER A FEE CONDITIONAL ESTATE
The first question which might be asked is what is the definition,
nature, and extent of an estate in fee simple conditional. At common law, before the passage of the Statute De Donis1 in England
in the year 1285, there were recognized two estates of inheritance.
One was a fee simple absolute, which was created by a conveyance
to a person and his heirs,2 generally, and the other a fee simple
conditional, which was created by a conveyance to a person and the
heirs of his body.3 During that time, it was held that since the
word "heirs" was used in the creation of a fee simple conditional, that
such an estate was greater than an estate for life.4 The early
construction of a fee simple conditional was to the effect that the
birth of issue to the grantee was contemplated by the grantor as a
condition to be met in order to perfect a transfer of an estate of
inheritance. After the fulfillment of the condition, the grantee of
such an estate has an interest which is, in many respects, comparable
to an estate in fee simple absolute.5 For example, the grantee of a
fee simple conditional can, after birth of issue, convey a fee simple
absolute by way of deed and thus bar his issue as well as the possibility of reverter. 6 The two estates are not similar, however, in
all respects, as is illustrated by the fact that the grantee of a fee
simple conditional cannot devise 7
In South Carolina, the Statute De Donis, which abolished the
fee simple conditional in England, was never adopted and most of
the early common law concepts regarding this estate in lands still exist
and are given effect in this state.8 However, in the many centuries
since the conception of this estate, the courts and writers have prevailed
to the end that certain of the original concepts have been changed
completely.
1. De Donis Conditionalibus, St. Westm. II, 13 Edw.I c. 1 (1285).
2. Idle v. Cook, I. P. Wins. 70, 24 Eng. Reprint 298 (1705).
3. Willion v. Berkly, I Plowd. 223, 75 Eng. Reprint 339 (1561).
4. Id.
5. For a discussion of all the qualities of a fee simple estate, see Anno., 114
A. L. R. 602, et. seq.
6. Crawford v. Masters, 98 S.C. 458, 82 S. E.793 (1914).
7. Postell v. Jones, HARPEs LAW 92 (S. C. 1824) ; See Anno., 114 A. L. R.
602 for other points of difference.
8. Creswell v. Bank of Greenwood, 210 S. C. 47, 41 S.R. (2d) 393 (1947);
Crawford v. Masters, 98 S. C. 458, 82 S. E. 793 (1914); Withers v. Jenkins,
14 S. C. 597 (1880); Buist v. Dawes, 4 RicH. EQ. 419 (S.C. 1829); Mazyck
v. Vanderhorst, BAILEYS EQ. 48 (S.C. 1828); Cruger v. Heyward, 2 DESAU.
EQ. 94 (S. C. 1802).
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One example of these changing concepts concerns the validity of
a remainder after an estate in fee simple conditional. This change
is deducible from the fact that prior to the passage of the Statute
De Donis, a remainder after a fee simple conditional was recognized
in the courts of England. 9 Such was the holding of the English
courts as early as the year 1220, and in the years following, a remainder after an estate in fee simple conditional was more common than
a remainder after a life estate.1 0 Early writings by Bracton and
Fleta reveal that there might have been a limitation of a fee simple
conditional to several persons in succession.1
Illustrative of recent indecision and doubt in regard to this point is a passage from
the South Carolina case of McCorkle v. Black,12 where it is stated

that the early case of Crugerv. Heyward13 intimated that a fee simple
conditional is a particular estate, like a fee tail, capable of supporting a remainder for the reason that after a fee simple conditional, a
reversion of the estate remained in the transferor, of which reversion
he had a right to dispose; the court hastily added that it doubted
whether this intimation would be followed should the occasion arise
to pass on the question. The early holdings and writings notwithstanding, the reports of later vintage are replete with decisions to
the effect that no remainder can be limited after a conveyance of
an estate in fee simple conditional. 14 The cases so holding take the
position that after a conveyance of the fee, whether conditional or
absolute, there is no remainder, as the conveyance carries the whole
estate and nothing remains to be the subject of further conveyance.
Because of the abundance of such holdings in South Carolina, it
seems to be a well settled rule of property law in this State that there
can be no remainder after a fee simple conditional,15 and there is
slight probability of change, regardless of the apparent inconsistency
with the thirteenth century decisions and various writings on the
subject.
9. II POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OV ENGLISH LAW 23, 24
10. Id.
11.
BRc~oN, Lib. 11, c. 6; FLORA, Lib. 3, c. 9.

(2d Ed. 1899).

12. 7 RICH. EQ. 420 (S. C. 1855).
13. 2 DzsAu. 94 (S. C. 1802).
14. Selman v. Robertson, 46 S. C. 262, 24 S. E. 187 (1895); Buist v. Dawes,
4 ST0oB. EQ. 49 (S. C. 1850) ; Deas v. Horry, 2 HirL EQ. 244 (S. C. 1835);
Bedon v. Bedon, 2 BAILy 231 (S. C. 1831); Bailey v. Seabrook, RicH. EQ.
Cases 419 (S. C. 1829) ; Mazyck v. Vanderhorst, BAI'S EQ. 48 (S. C. 1828) ;
See McLure v. Young, 3 RICH. EQ. 559, 574 (S. C. 1851) ; Edwards v. Barksdale, 2 HsL 184, 198 (S. C. 1835) ; Adams v. Chaplain, 1 HrLr, 265, 268 (S. C.
1833).
15. Accord, RESTATEMENT, FUTUR INTERESTS, § 156(2) (1940).
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EXECUTORY INTERESTS AVrUR A IEE SIMPLE CONDITIONAL
Although the limitation of an estate over by way of remainder
after a fee simple conditional appears to be precluded, there remains
to be considered the possibility of effectively creating such a limitation over by way of an executory interest. This problem is divisible,
according to whether the attempt to create such an executory interest
is by way of devise or by way of deed.
The early cases in this state, with almost complete unanimity, held
that an executory devise over on the death of the grantee of a fee
simple conditional without issue was void for remoteness.1 6 Such
decisions resulted from the application of a rule of construction to
the effect that the words "die without issue" were intended by the
transferor as an indefinite, rather than a definite, failure of issue,
and as a consequence the executory interest contingent thereon would
be in violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 17 However, an
Act' 8 was passed by the legislature in 1853 which reversed this rule
of construction as to the meaning of the term "die without issue"
(and words of like import) from an indefinite to a definite failure
of issue; thus the objection of remoteness to such an executory
devise was removed.' 9 The present status of the law in regard to
this matter is that a fee simple conditional, during its continuance
being the entire fee simple estate,2 0 is as fit a subject for an executory
devise as a fee simple estate.2 1 This seems to be so well settled, that
in a recent case22 the question was not raised nor did the court
deem it worthy of a discussion or a citation of authorities.
Although an executory interest after a fee simple conditional is
valid if by devise, an attempt to create an executory interest after
such an estate by way of deed is abortive under the South Carolina
cases.2 3 One of the early cases in this state rejecting such a limita16. Barksdale v. Gamage, 3 Ricn. EQ. 271 (S. C. 1851); Buist v. Dawes, 4

STRoB. EQ. 49 (S. C. 1850); Bedon v. Bedon, 2 BAILEY 231 (S. C. 1831); Mazyck v. Vanderhorst, BAILEY'S EQ. 48 (S. C. 1828). But cf. Powers v. Bul-

winkle, 33 S. C. 293, 11 S. E. 971 (1890).
17. Mangrum v. Piester, 16 S. C. 316 (1881).

18. S. C. CODS § 8871 (1942).
19. Strother v. Folk, 123 S. C. 127, 115 S. E. 605 (1922).
20. Adams v. Verner, 102 S. C. 7, 86 S. E. 211 (1915) ; Du Pont v. Du Bos,
52 S. C. 244, 29 S. E. 655 (1898) ; Adams v. Chaplin, 1 HILi's EQ. 278 (1833).
21. Dukes v. Shuler, 185 S. C. 303, 194 S. E. 817 (1937); Selman v. Robertson, 46 S. C. 262, 24 S. E. 187 (1895). But cf., dissenting opinion of Wardlaw, Ch., in Buist v. Dawes, 4 RicH. EQ. 421, 495 (S. C. 1852).
,
22. Cannon v. Ballanger . ........... S. C............. Westbrook's Adv. Sheet, July

12, 1952.

23. Antly v. Antly, 132 S. C. 306, 128 S. E. 31 (1925); Allen v. Fogler, 6

RIcH. L. 54 (1852).

Contra, REsTATrm.ENT, FUTRZ INTERPST, § 25.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1952

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1952], Art. 8

SOUTH CAROLINA: LAW QUARTERLY

tion after a fee simple conditional, while recognizing that the limitation would be valid if by devise (no question of remoteness being
involved), based the rejection on Fearne's statement that "a fee at
common law cannot be mounted on a fee; as if lands are limited to
one and his heirs, and if he dies without heirs, then to another; this
last is void".2 5 Four years prior to this rejection of an executory
limitation after a fee simple conditional, the court, in the case of
Edwards v. Edwardsi0 had rejected an executory interest after a
fee simple estate by way of deed, the limitation in the Edwards Case
being, to A, his heirs and assigns forever, but should A die without
issue of his body, over ... 7 It appears that it was not until 1925
that an executory interest after a fee simple estate by way of deed
was upheld by the court.28 The limitation was in the form; to A,
but if he dies without issue, over,. . . habendum, to A, his heirs and
assigns. The court appeared to reason that the condition of defeasance and the limitation over were inserted prior to the creation of
the fee estate in A, due to the omission of the words of inheritance from the granting clause, and therefore the executory interest was inserted before the estate to A became a fee simple. The
resulting estate, called a fee defeasible, was subsequently upheld on
what was apparently the same line of reasoning. 2 9 Although the
court's trend of thought concerning the validity of an executory interest limited after the whole estate in fee simple conditional by
deed has apparently remained unchanged since the recognition of
the fee simple defeasible estate, 30 it should be noted that, apparently, no case has arisen where the limitation was in such a form as
follows: granting clause, to A, but if he die without leaving issue,
over, habendum, to A and the issue of his body.

Under the case

of Smith v. Clinkscales,3 1 which first recognized the fee simple defeasible with a limitation 'over, there is apparently no logical reason

why such a limitation should not be upheld by the court. The question may have become academic as to this latter limitation, however,

for the strained reasoning of Smith v. Clinkscales32 and Wilson v.
24. Allen v. Fogler, 6 RICH. L. 54 (1852).
25. FIJARNI, REMAINDERS, c. 6, § 8, p. 371.
26. 2 STRoB. EQ.101 (1848).
27. It should be noted that no question of remoteness was involved in this
limitation.
28. Smith v.Clinkscales, 102 S. C. 227, 85 S. E. 1064 (1915).
29. Wilson v. Poston, 129 S. C. 345, 123 S. E. 849 (1924).
30. Antly v. Antly, 132 S. C. 306, 128 S.E. 31 (1925).
31. 102 S. C. 227, 85 S. E. 1064 (1915).
32. Antly v. Antly, 132 S. C. 306, 128 S. E. 31 (1925).
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Poston3 has apparently been bandoned. In McDaniel v. Conner,34
decided in- 1945, the limitation was in the form: to A, and his lawful
heirs after him, but if he should die without lawful heirs of the body,
over, habendum, to A, Iiis heirs and assigns forever. The court
sustained the validity of the limitation over and rejected the argument that the validity of the limitation should depend on the presence or absence of words of inheritance in the granting clause.
Under this liberal view, which certainly appears to be a reversal of
the position taken by the court in some of the earlier cases,3 5 the
court should have little difficulty in sustaining an executory interest
after a fee simple conditional, especially since it appears that the
reason previously given for striking down such interests was due
to the fact that a fee simple conditional was, during its continuance,
the entire fee simple estate.36
CONCLUSION

It is difficult to perceive any logical reason why an executory interest after a fee simple conditional estate, created by deed should
not be held valid. As illustrated by the McDaniel Case,37 the modern
trend of the courts is to relax the technical restrictions on the alienability of interests in property. By the recognition of the validity
of an executory devise after a fee simple conditional, the courts have
allowed, in effect, subject to limitations, the devise of an estate equivalent to that interest a devisor or his heirs might take under a possibility of reverter,38 despite the fact that the South Carolina decisions
continue to verbally support the view that a possibility of reverter,

33. 129 S. C. 345, 123 S. E. 849 (1924).
34. 206 S. C. 96,33 S. E. (2d) 75 (1945).
35. Glenn v. Jamison, 48 S. C. 316, 26 S. E. 677 (1896) ; Edwards v. Edwards,
2 STROB. EQ. 101 (S. C. 1848).
36. Allen v. Fogler, 6 RIcH. L. 54 (1852). See Antly v. Antly, 132 S. C.
306, 128 S. C. 31 (1925).
37. Supra, note 33.
38. For a complete discussion of this paradox, see UNIVEMSITY OP S. C. SELDEN SocisTy YEARBOK, vol. VII, p. 42 (Jn-1943). This view is fortified by
the holding that the taker under an executory devise after a fee simple conditional is barred by an alienation after birth of issue by the grantee of the
fee simple conditional, just as the devisor would be barred thereby from ever
taking under the possibility of reverter. Robert v. Ellis, 59 S. C. 137, 37
S. E. 250 (1900); Buist v. Dawes, 4 Rcir. EQ. 421 (S. C. 1852); Bailey v.
Seabrook, RIcH. EQ. Cases 419 (S. C. 1829). It should be noted that a possibility of reverter, not being an estate, Waller v. Waller, 220 S. C. -212, 66
S. R. (2d) 876 (1951), is not affected by the rule against perpetuities, GRAY,
RULE AGAINST PERPm SiTrIrs, § 313 (2d Ed. 1906); SImt-s, III FUTURE INTFatsT, § 506, but an executory interest is subject to being invalidated under
the rule. Barksdale v. Gamage, 3 RicH. EQ. 271 (S. C. 1851).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1952

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1952], Art. 8

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTRILY

not being an estate, cannot be devised.39 Recognition of the validity
of an executory limitation after a fee simple conditional by way of
deed would similarly extend the alienability of interests arising out
of an estate most often resorted to for its inalienable characteristics.
ROBERT E. JOHNSON.

39. Waller v. Wailer, 220 S. C. 212, 66 S. E. (2d) 876 (1951); Burnett v.
Snoddy, 199 S. C. 399, 19 S. E. (2d) 904 (1942); Blount v. Walker, 31 S. C.
13, 27, 9 S. R. 80 (1888); Burnett v. Burnett, 17 S. C. 545 (1882). This
view is not followed in all jurisdictions. Brown v. Independent Baptist Church
of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N. E. (2d) 922 (1951).
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